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Abstract: The essay discusses the concept of character, and some related notions, 
as they emerge in the contemporary discourse on education. The aim of this article 
is to provide a sociological interpretation of the increasing relevance of such 
notions within education policy agendas at the global level. More precisely, the 
focus is on what could be described as an intensification of reflexivity upon the 
human being, and a growing interest in the ‘whole child’ in educational agendas, 
i.e. in personal development beyond the learning outcomes regarding academic 
topics. The argument develops three main points. First, the principal structural and 
cultural conditionings are examined that play a role in fostering the renewed 
importance of personhood. Furthermore, different conceptual frameworks are 
examined that result in different psycho-semantics. The essay shows how such 
concepts as character and social and emotional skills (SES) epitomize different, 
comprehensive conceptions of human selfhood. The article examines their 
divergence and convergence alike. Finally, some possibilities of integration 
between the approaches of character and SES are briefly sketched.  
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Introduction. The re-emergence of character in education – and why 
bother  
 
The following reflections concern the concept of character, and some 
related concepts revolving around what are often regarded as crucial human 
qualities, as they emerge in the contemporary discourse on education. The 
aim of this article is to provide a sociological interpretation of the 
increasing relevance of such a notion within education policy agendas at 
the global level. More precisely, my focus is on what could be described as 
an intensification of reflexivity upon the human being, and a growing 
interest in the ‘whole child’ in educational agendas, i.e. in personal 
development beyond the learning outcomes regarding academic topics like 
mathematics, history, or reading skills.   
The argument will develop in three main points. First, the principal 
structural and cultural conditionings will be examined that play a role in 
fostering the renewed importance of personhood. Furthermore, I will claim 
that different conceptual frameworks result in different psycho-semantics. 
Different concepts like that of character or of social and emotional skills in 
education epitomize different, comprehensive conceptions of human 
selfhood. I will therefore describe their divergence and partial overlap. 
Finally, I will outline a few directions the research and policy agendas may 
take, depending on the approach they assume to moral and character 
education, and will briefly sketch some possibilities of integration.  
Through this démarche, I want to make a few substantive points. First, 
the article will show that the new emphasis on ‘humanity’, its powers and 
potentials has deep roots in the highly differentiated system of global 
society, and cannot be traced back to the usual ‘litany of alarm’ concerning 
the ills of society and the social problems of young people, like crime rates, 
sexual abuse, risk behaviour, drugs, truancy, and so forth
1
. Therefore, 
character education does not necessarily reflect the worried attitude of 
traditionalist, authoritarian nostalgia for the past.  
Moreover, the aim of this essay is not to argue for or against one 
specific notion of character, or one particular way to translate it into 
educational practice. As a sociologist, I do not think such issues can be 
settled a priori beyond rather generic references to obviously shared ‘good’ 
                                                     
1 I take this formulation from James Arthur, who aptly rejects the allegation (Arthur, 2014, 
pp. 50-52).  
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vs. ‘bad’ human traits. The challenge is to understand how the current 
societal dynamics – with the erosion of our customary, modern time-space 
structures – prompt the emergence of new forms of personal and social life, 
thereby shaping the human characteristics needed to inhabit such an 
environment. The challenge consists of the tensions centred on the complex 
relationship that binds social and cultural change with the meanings of 
being human articulated in various regions of the cultural system and lived 
out in everyday life. Sociological analysis has often seen the impact of 
social change on character as sheerly adaptive and clearly corrosive 
(Sennett, 1998; Hunter, 2000). On the other hand, although it remains true 
that society puts a prize on some types of character and a penalty on others, 
character education still holds out the hope that persons can become 
something ‘more’ or ‘better’ than what they are. In this respect, it maintains 
a connection with some notion of self-improvement and ‘verticality’ 
(Sloterdijk, 2013). Furthermore, character may even become the symbolical 
centre of counter-cultural resistance, insofar as ‘people of character’ are 
defined as those who will not go with the drift of the socio-cultural 
mainstream, and will be able to keep to their lifestyles even as a minority 
group. In this sense, character would constitute the formula of 
transcendence education uses to exceed the given social arrangements.  
In sum, the educational doctrines and practices revolving around human 
character – in their various semantics – are an important benchmark of deep 
cultural change. How this happens, and where it could lead, is something 
we are just beginning to understand.  
 
 
The coming morphogenic society and the hardship of being human 
 
There are various ways in which social theory has been tackling the 
complexity of contemporary global society and its ongoing change. Among 
these conceptual frames, we assume the morphogenetic approach as a 
helpful interpretation of the current societal predicament
2
. Such an 
approach has recently prompted a substantive thesis about macro-social 
                                                     
2 Its theoretical foundations have been laid by Margaret Archer. See Archer, 1995, for a 
systematic outline. See also Archer, 2011, for a helpful summary of the model in its 
explanatory function.  
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change, namely that of an emerging morphogenic society
3
. A few words of 
explanation are in order. The word ‘morphogenetic’ refers to the intrinsic 
tendency of all human societies to generate and change (social) forms – 
institutions, organizations, cultures, etc.. The morphogenetic approach 
provides the conceptual tools to study the logics of such processes, as the 
outcome of complex interactions between structure, culture, and agency, 
and the resulting emergent effects. But what is a ‘morphogenic society’? In 
a nutshell, a morphogenic society is one in which the change-driving 
(morphogenetic) characteristics of society are substantially more dominant 
than the stability-enhancing (morphostatic) characteristics; so a 
morphogenic society (hereafter MS) is one that tends to undergo profound 
and – in principle – boundless change. Thus, I call ‘morphogenic’ the 
specific societal syndrome characterized by the situational logic of 
opportunity, stemming from ‘unbound morphogenesis’ (i.e. one unfettered 
from morphostasis) and possibly leading to a wholly novel societal 
formation.   
Our present aim is not to develop or discuss such a conceptual 
framework. Our point here is to highlight a few big ‘social facts’ that can 
be traced to that core mechanism of change, thereby finding a consistent 
unifying interpretation.  
The emergence of the MS obviously entails massive social change along 
many different dimensions
4
. Three sets of phenomena are especially 
important for our present argument:  
(a) the explosion of possibilities for action and experience; 
(b) the acceleration of social life; 
(c) the saturation of social and symbolic space. 
Let us briefly outline all of them, and explain how they meaningfully 
connect with an intensified reflexive focus on human powers and 
properties.  
(a) The multiplication of possibilities for action and experience lies at 
the core of the MS and of its ‘engine’, i.e. the logic of opportunity. 
Scientific and technological innovation are clearly supporting this process. 
The related transformations of the economic sphere, particularly of work 
and working environments, the increased centrality of the human resource 
                                                     
3 The thesis has now been articulated in a series of volumes. See Archer (Ed.), 2013; 2014; 
2015; 2016.  
4 Some of the most relevant dynamics are explored in Archer (2014).   
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(represented in the educational discourse by such concepts as 
personalization, creativity, problem solving skills, etc.), and deep cultural 
change (e.g. one concerning values), coalesce to generate new personal 
lifestyles and forms of social life.  
(b) Social acceleration theory has been proposed as a particular 
perspective from which modernization theory can be reinterpreted. The 
basic idea is that ‘large’ social dynamics, meso-level processes, and 
interactions in everyday life are increasingly accelerating, changing 
individual and collective ‘rhythm of life’, disrupting old equilibria in 
temporal structures as well as in our personal use of time – e.g. the 
work/family balance, the shape and trajectory of personal biographies, etc. 
Arguably, it should not be (too ambitiously) treated as a ‘first mover’ of 
social morphogenesis, but as an empirical generalization that keeps 
together a large set of empirical evidence concerning the temporal 
structures of society. Its connection with the generative logic of the MS has 
been articulated before
5
.   
(c) A further element must be added, although its inherent relationship 
with the MS would need more explanation than I can offer in this article. It 
may be called the saturation of social and symbolic space, and it is really 
the emergent effect of two different factors. One is the enormous growth of 
relational and communicative networks – increasingly consisting of virtual 
relationships – that fill every gap of silence and claim a growing amount of 
our time
6
. The other might be introduced by a quote from Karl Jaspers: «A 
total metamorphosis of history has taken place. The essential fact is: There 
is no longer anything outside. The world is closed. The unity of the earth 
has arrived»
7
. Despite the obviously suspicious nature of such grand and 
sweeping declarations, this is a very consequential point, about which 
sociologists would probably have to reflect more systematically than they 
have done so far. What I want to emphasize here is that these two big 
                                                     
5 See Maccarini (2014). For a recent formulation of social acceleration theory see Rosa 
(2013).  
6 Such a phenomenon, well known to all communication experts, and indeed to all of us 
inhabitants of late modern societies, was effectively described, among others, by Kenneth 
Gergen (1991).  
7 See Jaspers (1953, p. 127). The italics is mine.  
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‘social facts’ converge on generating a unified
8
, saturated communicative, 
symbolic, and physical environment for people to inhabit.  
One outcome of these trends can be summarized as an intensified 
pressure upon human beings, which is the other face of the coin of the now 
fashionable ‘centrality of the person’. We already know that the MS 
involves the crisis of routine action and the rise of the reflexive imperative 
(Archer, 2012). The continuity and congruity of social contexts is 
increasingly disrupted by boundless morphogenesis. Novel situations 
emerge, and people can hardly find guidance for their course of action in 
habits and routines. As a consequence, they must increasingly rely upon 
their personal reflexivity, as the capacity to evaluate one’s life plans in 
relation to a changing world. The imperative to select among possible 
experiences and actions involves an enhanced effectiveness in decision 
making. We might now venture to extend such a hypothesis, considering 
the widening and intensification of reflexivity to be covering just one 
aspect of a more complex phenomenon, namely a multidimensional 
pressure on the human. Such a pressure surely includes reflexivity and the 
‘selective imperative’, with the related issue of decision making. However, 
the trends of social change outlined above also push to flexibility and 
adaptation, and are increasingly demanding in terms of the personal effort 
required to participate in social processes of any kind – from education to 
work, down to health, civic life, and so forth. Performance is no more 
confined to the sphere of the market economy. Activation, mobilization, 
investment, initiative, have become keywords of social life, as well as 
passwords to get services.  
The dynamics of European welfare systems is a helpful example. The 
idea that people must be enabled to help themselves, learning to protect 
themselves from risks, and that this requires their wholehearted 
mobilization, is now rather commonsensical in most welfare literature, e.g. 
in the new mainstream of ‘social investment’.  
As a result of this, education has achieved a central position in lifestyle 
and the life course, while new, hybrid policy mechanisms arise that are 
centered on education and training (Miettinen, 2013). While this situation is 
quite clear, few seem to have seen its consequences in terms of the personal 
                                                     
8 To speak of a ‘unified’ social space here does emphatically not signify one that is free 
from conflict. I just mean to suggest the strict interdependence and the lack of ‘distance’ 
between regional societies, social spheres, social groups, and so on.  
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stress and strain these social dynamics bring about at the personal level. 
And while concern-oriented reflexivity is the response to the choice-and-
decision making issue, it is more unclear how people can positively cope 
with the rest of the problem.   
In other words, the present situation could be described as a crisis (or 
indeed, the end?) of Entlastung. The concept of Entlastung (literally 
‘exoneration’) must be traced to Arnold Gehlen (2007; 2013). Basically, his 
point is that humans as vulnerable, flawed beings need help in what are 
crucial dimensions of their surviving and thriving. This is the task of 
institutions. Now, what I am arguing here is that the capacity of institutions 
to perform such a task might be sharply declining. Some authors would 
counter that institutions are simply switching to ‘enabling institutions’, and 
that the related ‘malaise’ can be explained away as a peculiar characteristic 
of some particular countries (see e.g. Ehrenberg, 2010). For what merits 
such studies may have, it remains true that institutions are now bound to 
take on a different, and less ambitious function than they had in the past. 
Moreover, it is also the capacity of society to build and regenerate effective 
institutions that is here called into question. Participating in institutions and 
their organized forms of life, making one’s way through them and their 
consolidated paths – for example, successfully completing a ‘curriculum’ – 
ultimately makes less sense than ever. The human person is becoming 
central in global society, but this means she must increasingly fall back on 
herself. And she needs a broader range of skills than she once used to.  
 
 
Character and skills: education as psycho-semantics 
 
The MS and the related emergent phenomena – the explosion of variety, 
acceleration, and saturation – constitute a profound and multifarious 
challenge for education to face. Its academic aspect could be summarized 
in a fundamental question: what should we learn, and how? Curriculum 
redesign is becoming as timely as ever. First there is a quantitative 
problem. Should we continue to learn all we have learned so far, while 
including novel competencies and knowledge in the curriculum? Can we 
really do this, or do we have to be selective? What can be forsaken and 
forgotten? Many plans to redesign teaching and learning emphasize the 
following competencies: 
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(i) basic competencies: recognizing patterns, memory, rapidity in 
processing information; 
(ii) acquiring knowledge: access, extract, interpret information; 
(iii) elaborate knowledge: reflect, argue, conceptualize.   
Be that as it may, these problems only scratch the surface of a deeper 
issue. What kind of person should be the goal of education in this societal 
context? What kind of powers
9
 and qualities should a person possess to 
make her way through that social world?   
Answers to these questions are widespread in a huge literature, 
particularly in developmental psychology and the educational sciences. 
They usually include long lists of personal characteristics, couched in 
different languages and theoretical frameworks. It is not my aim to examine 
them in detail, and decide which ones are more important than others, or 
what method should be used to bring them about
10
. On a higher level of 
abstraction, the point is to highlight two distinct educational semantics. 
Although they entail obvious inner differentiation, they can be said to 
represent the main cultural alternatives, and to be systematically linked 
with more general psycho-semantics. We can indicate these doctrines 
through the labels of character education and of social and emotional 
skills, respectively. I will try to illustrate their main meanings, divergence 
and convergence as different ways for educational semantics to react to 
social change.  
What do we mean by character in the first place? The concept of 
character has both a formal and a substantive meaning. In a formal sense, it 
has been described as the ethical aspect of our personal traits, or the ethical 
value placed on our desires and on relations to others. It is meant to qualify 
our moral connection to the world, and it refers to the long term aspect of 
our emotional experience (Sennett, 1998, pp. 10; see also pp. 140 ff.). 
Loyalty, commitment, pursuit of long term goals, delayed gratification for 
the sake of a future end all fall within the range of what sociology usually 
means with the term ‘character’. A more systematic approach takes three 
dimensions into consideration, defining character as comprised of moral 
                                                     
9 The idea of ‘empowerment’ in educational doctrines and practices should also be read in 
this perspective.  
10 Detailed analyses are to be found in an extended literature. See the significant synthetic 
efforts in the thorough accounts by Nucci, Narvaez and Krettenauer, 2014; John and De 
Fruyt, 2015; Schleicher et al., 2015. These also constitute the basic ground of my own 
account in the following pages.  
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discipline, moral attachment, and moral autonomy
11
. Discipline refers to the 
capacity of an individual to inhibit his or her personal appetites or interests, 
or to delay gratification. Following Hunter and colleagues, we could say 
that moral discipline is the inner capacity for restraint—an ability to inhibit 
oneself in one’s passions, desires, and habits within the boundaries of a 
moral order. Moral attachment points to a positive element, namely a 
greater good or ideal to affirm and live by, a commitment which justifies 
sacrifice
12
. Finally, the element of moral autonomy highlights the idea that 
actions and decisions can only be ethical when they are made freely. 
Controlled behavior cannot be moral behavior, for it removes the element 
of discretion and judgment. Character is therefore constituted by the 
relational bundle of these moral properties It is shaped throughout the 
process of identity building, emerging through emotions, deliberations, 
practices, and ethical habits that come to define a lifestyle.  
This process does not happen within the boundaries of the personal 
psychic systems, but involves a continuous conversation between structural 
and cultural conditioning factors (among which moral ideals), on the one 
hand, and personal reflexivity on the other hand. Character has its symbolic 
and social ecology. In its substantive sense, character is constituted by the 
enactments of some particular moral ideals. Embracing such ideals and 
enacting them within the institutions of particular communities or spheres 
of social life establishes a circular process, through which particular types 
of character develop and in turn come to influence the way social roles are 
played out and organizations or institutions work. The related moral 
properties are valorized in a society’s social institutions and celebrated in 
those exemplars who practice them well
13
. Therefore, the substantive sense 
of character involves its cultural content, insofar as it defines the personal 
properties, habits, lifestyles, forms of reasoning and even of emotional life 
                                                     
11 This definition can be found in the Moral Foundations of Education Project by the 
Institute of Advanced Studies in Culture, University of Virginia, and it is a further 
articulation of previous work on the subject (see above all Hunter, 2000; Seider, 2012).  
12 This aspect was emphasized by Douglas Porpora (Porpora, 2001). This originally shaped 
an interesting complementarity between his work and Hunter’s cited book on character 
(Hunter, 2000), which has now been registered within the comprehensive definition we are 
currently discussing.  
13 In this sense, a sociology of character might usefully interact with Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s work on ‘grandeur’ (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006).  
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to which a given society – or a given subsystem of society – attaches a 
positive judgment and a consistent normative reinforcement.  
The level of aggregation on which this can be observed obviously 
depends on the researcher’s perspective and interest. In this sense it is 
possible to maintain that there is a ‘protestant’, a ‘modern’, a 
‘bureaucratic’, an ‘American’, an ‘authoritarian’ vs. ‘anti-authoritarian’ 
character, and more, depending on the research focus and the field of 
inquiry.   
Insofar as the concept of character has been developed within the 
educational discourse, its connection with social structures and cultures has 
also been shaped by an educational intention. The basic questions one 
wants to answer through the study of character are about the moral state of 
society, and how to improve it. Therefore, the educational literature evokes 
numerous human characteristics and qualities the authors regard as 
important in and for society – from justice to motivation, to mindfulness, 
etc. Such qualities can also be studied as indicators of what culture provides 
as a resource to connect with society.  
A sociological interpretation of the contemporary relevance of character 
must take into account two, distinct though mutually interweaving lines of 
thought that may be identified in the uses and development of the concept. 
These convey different concerns, as well as different educational agendas 
regarding the relationship between society and personhood, between social 
structures and human agency.  
a) the socio-historical line: since its emergence, the idea of character has 
highlighted the reaction on the personal level to phases of rapid social 
change (morphogenesis) in the dynamics and differentiation of society. 
Cultural historians have argued that a ‘culture of character’ was meant to be 
the personal companion to Weber’s grim view of Western capitalism, 
following the pattern of Entzauberung. In this context, the concept of 
character indicates the trajectory of personhood from early capitalism – 
with the related disruption of existing social structures and cultures – down 
to consumerism and technology supported hedonism. In a nutshell, the 
‘changes in character’, and its eventual decline giving way to ‘personality’, 
are meant to describe the trajectory from instrumental individualism, with 
its syndrome of self-control, to expressive individualism, featuring the 
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well-known earmark of anxiety, depression, and fragility
14
.  
As the twentieth century drew to a close, character, and character 
education, became part of the dynamics opposing virtue-based to principle-
based accounts of morality, within the frame of the liberal-communitarian 
debate. Then, since the beginning of the twenty-first century the virtue vs. 
duty issue has been absorbed within a more complex discussion concerning 
globalization and its implications for morality. The relevance of such a 
discussion is focused upon the consequences for moral education of a world 
inhabited by multiple cultural, religious, and lifestyle communities. This 
situation involves problems and challenges that include, but go far beyond 
those of ‘solidarity between strangers’.  
The current situation reflects the effort to react to the pressure related to 
the MS, social acceleration and the end of Entlastung.  
The emphasis falls either on the economic or on the political system. 
The effect of capitalism and consumerism on character is invariably held to 
be disruptive. It is in this vein that Sennett (1998) worries about how we 
decide what is of lasting value in a society which focuses on the immediate 
moment. How can long term goals be pursued in an economy devoted to 
the short term? How can mutual loyalties and commitments be sustained in 
institutions which are constantly breaking apart or continually being 




At the same time, a whole literature – from Tocqueville to Bellah and 
colleagues, from Riesman to Porpora – has considered character and the 
related educational programs to be crucial for the democratic quality of 
social and political life. This seems to show that American society still 
perceives its own essential qualities as meaningfully related with personal 
properties, while Europe has been developing along a path of social 
immunization from human traits. Such a hypothesis of divergent evolution 
within the West must be investigated further, as it could have far-reaching 
implications for the future of our societies.  
b) The scope of these concerns becomes even clearer if we examine the 
ontological meaning of the concept of character, and its place in social 
theory. In this context, character is often opposed to personality and the 
                                                     
14 This is the view most cultural historians hold. See, with reference to American society, 
Susman, 1984; Lasch-Quinn, 2007.  
15 Such a critique is also somewhat echoed by Boltanski and Chiapello (2007).  
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Self, the latter being «a strictly psychological term, deliberately stripped of 
the moral and metaphysical implications (…), one that asks to be evaluated 
strictly by the non-judgmental therapeutic standard of ‘health’.» (McClay, 
2007, p. 9). The main problem here is what concept prevails as a societal 
psycho-semantic. This perspective qualifies social change as conducive to 
the shift from person and character, on the one hand, to personality and 
‘psychological man’, on the other hand, which is supposed to emphasize 
morality vs. psychic health as the focal points of alternative anthropologies. 
It is with this thrust that Charles Taylor noted how social science involved 
a reductionist view of the self (Taylor, 1989, pp. 33-35), in which horizons 
are restricted and moral dimensions are transformed into personality 
features. One practical consequence is that the emphasis on personality will 
produce weak characters. Character would indeed continue to include an 
idea of flourishing as the normative goal of human development. Such 
‘betterness’ indicates the moral dimension of selfhood. Then of course 
further divides emerge about what conceptions of such flourishing must 
prevail. Be that as it may, the notion of character often works as a 
humanistic counterpart to the social scientific view of the human person. 
The continual interrelations between these two lines of thought shape 
moral crises, tensions, challenges, and responses in different societal 
contexts. Both converge in the current re-emergence of ‘character’ as a 
psycho-semantic that is meant to defend (i) a moral foundation of self-
consistency, integrity, and human dignity, and (ii) the critical capacity to 
resist social and cultural drift, reconstructing a way to enact social roles 
with some moral quality. As a latent human property or power, character 
becomes particularly important every time the Entlastung of institutions 
seems to be declining. Its relevance lies in exceeding education as 
socialization, and empowering alternative forms of education, agency, and 
personal as well as social life.  
To sum up, the idea of character has clearly been a tool for social 
critique in the face of social change that is claimed to jeopardize both the 
human quality of social life and the social conditions of human flourishing. 
Not surprisingly, it appeals to countercultural groups, who perceive the 
world-as-it-is and the current cultural mainstream as inherently hostile to 
their ways and lifestyles.  
My thesis is that analogous personal properties are appreciated – albeit 
on the ground of rather different concerns – in very different regions of the 
global social structure and cultural system, by actors working within a 
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different scientific paradigm. And this ‘strange convergence’ lends some 
support to the hypothesis that these educational psycho-semantics could 
represent reactions to the same social changes characterizing the MS, 
particularly those I have claimed to result in the increased pressure upon 
the human person.  
The line of thought I am referring to revolves around the concept of 
social and emotional skills (hereafter SES). Social and emotional skills 
could be defined as individual capacities that (a) are manifested in 
consistent patterns of thoughts, feelings and behaviours, (b) can be 
developed through formal and informal learning experiences, and (c) 
influence important socioeconomic outcomes throughout individual’s life 
(OECD, 2014; OECD, 2015).  Now, SES are increasingly at the centre of 
scholarly and education policy attention. The tendency to some sort of 
‘SES mainstreaming’ appears in the policy oriented research agendas by 
global actors (e.g. Schleicher et al., 2015) as well as by groups of scholars 
(Elias et al., 2014; John and De Fruyt, 2015)
16
.  
The root of such a growing interest for SES lies in the fact that the 
global economic and working environments involve enhanced complexity 
and interaction, thereby highlighting the strict connection between all types 
of human skills.  
The main concerns being raised here have to do with employability and 
human functioning in complex, cosmopolitan, highly interactive 
organizational and professional social spheres. Instead of values and norms 
characterizing different cultures, communities and collective identities, the 
idea is that a few universal human properties can constitute an adequate, 
‘healthy’ personality (De Fruyt, 2009). There are universal personal 
features that can foster human flourishing, helping people to achieve the 
most they can and to become the best they can be. And these can be 
measured and shaped through educational processes. Individual and 
collective happiness is the expected outcome of these dynamics.  
As in the case of character, multiple models provide long lists of skills, 
based on various assumptions about human personality and its relations to 
the world. The synthetic conceptual framework laid out by John and De 
Fruyt (2015) makes an instructive example of where this is all going. They 
list the following areas, with inner component skills:  
                                                     
16 The relevant literature is too extended to be quoted meaningfully. See the work cited 
above for updated references.  
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(i) pursuing goals: perseverance, self-control, passion for the goal; 
(ii) working with others: sociability, respect, care (‘tending and 
befriending’); 
(iii) managing emotions: self-esteem, optimism, trust.  
In a nutshell, the global self should be trained to react against hardships, 
increase his/her effort and endurance of hard work, and enhance his/her 
engagement with society. Happiness and multidimensional life success 
should be the offspring of this syndrome. Indeed, a huge lot of life 
outcomes are expected to depend on the enhancement of these skills, 
including social cohesion in multicultural societies, active citizenship, 
health and work related achievements, and more.  
Through this conceptual framework an ambitious educational agenda 
replaces the exclusive focus upon standardized test results measuring 
learning outcomes in academic disciplines. An integral, ‘durkheimian’ idea 
of education develops into a plan of rationalization, cultivation and 
empowerment – of full mobilization of all human capacities.  
We find ourselves here at an important cultural crossroads. The 
educational semantics we have outlined, respectively revolving around the 
concepts of character and SES, could be labeled psycho-economic and 
ethical-culturalist. Their divergence and convergence could be understood 
through the following three points:  
(a) The idea of SES entails a significant shift from what was formerly 
the key notion of human capital to the  centrality of social and emotional, 
or also ‘soft’ skills (Heckman, 2001; 2008; Heckman and Kautz, 2012). 
This involves passing from something one can accumulate and stock to 
something pertaining to the persons’ agency. Skills have to do with what 
one can do, and they come to define what one is, in a pretty dynamic way. 
Furthermore, SES seem to be related to multifarious life outcomes, while 
human capital is typically more limited in the purposes for which it is 
supposed to be effective. The approach to human capacities remains 
basically functionalistic, but its boundaries tend to blur in terms of what 
contributes to ‘life success’ – also defined in very broad terms.  
(b) The scope of what is meant by the concept of skill is overly 
extended, embracing both processes and outcomes, and including features 
as diverse as endurance, optimism, trust, open-mindedness, respect, and 
care for others
17
. This expansion is effectively indicated by the expression 
                                                     
17 See especially the virtuously clear version of John and De Fruyt (2015).  
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of ‘character skills’, which is sometimes used by the same authors – 
particularly Heckman.  
(c) Table 1 shows what both semantics have in common, namely a 
reactive, a pro-active, and an integrative dimension. However, the ethical-
culturalist one, based on the concept of character, also includes a 
constitutive dimension concerning ‘the good’, while the psycho-economic 
notion of SES lacks such an aspect, which is only represented by such 
attitudes as ‘open-mindedness’, ‘curiosity’, and the like.. To put it in 
Charles Taylor’s words, the space in which persons move and act – 
practicing and testing their skills – has a definitely moral qualification. 
With this, their capacity to make sense of experience – and ultimately, of 
themselves and their personal and social condition – is enhanced by the 
possibility to appeal reflexively to some symbolical resources.  
 
 
























Attachment to a good 
(autonomous 
investment of self) 
Autonomous 
commitment to values 
within a community 









Being sociable, working 
with others 
 
To sum up, the intensified reflexive focus on the human subject is 
producing different educational psycho-semantics. Among them, character 
and SES epitomize the juncture between a neo-humanistic and a mainly 
functionalistic view of personhood. Although these articulate different 
ways for human beings to make a successful way through the complex 
morphogenic, high speed society – that is, to flourish in such a complex 
environment – they also refer to similar personal properties. They 
obviously differ in the consideration of identity and culture, but their 
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Character (and) skills: from divergence to integration?   
 
The consequences of the massive social change we have described 
through the image of the MS include a full mobilization of personal 
properties and the intensive interaction between all human powers. This in 
turn opens the perspective of a ‘post-disciplinary’ way to conceive and 
design policies, with the hybridization of organizational forms and 
institutional pillars. Welfare and educational institutions make a good 
example (Miettinen, 2013).   
Within the educational domain, such a situation evoked the problem of 
skills. In an important line of scientific and policy related thought, the basic 
idea is that given the pressure on the human being prompted by the 
explosion of variety and the possibilities for action and experience, we can 
learn our way out of such a predicament through the acquisition of skills 
and the building of a skills society. Such a notion is obviously complex, but 
its core lies in the range of skills individuals are said to need in order to 
meet the challenge. The emphasis falls on learning.  
In the approach centred on SES the educational ideal, and indeed what 
makes a successful life, approaches the idea of pure exercise. Its subject, 
therefore, will be the practising person
18
. On the other hand, character 
education emphasizes cultural contents and the capacity of value 
commitment. The import of this divergence can be articulated in various 
points, which I only sketchily outline. They represent some of the key 
differences characterizing two possible forms of an emergent global 
Bildung: 
(i) the human person can be regarded as an ideal form to be reached (a 
coordinated set of qualities that are to flourish) vs. a medium, i.e. as an 
active platform of powers and properties to be enhanced by learning;  
(ii) the educational ideal can be conceived of in basic continuity vs. 
discontinuity with respect to the modern traditions; 
(iii) the global dimension can prevail over local or national cultural 
traditions, thereby constituting different paths to moral universalism;  
(iv) critical thinking appears in the theory as the capacity to reflexively 
exceed existing mainstream ideas and doctrines vs. the competence of 
strategic thinking and openness to new solutions to existing problems.  
                                                     
18 This expression intentionally refers to Sloterdijk’s (2013) notions of practice and 
anthropotechnics. 
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Although the different meanings involved in each point are mutually 
related, one of them tends to be skewed towards technical competence and 
performance. Ultimately, lifestyle itself may be conceived of as 
competence and performance. Social performance involves the 
coordination of cognition, emotion and behaviour, which develop over 
time. Character emphasizes a culturally and politically active conception of 
the person.  
Thus, it is positive that human goods and skills are not the same thing. 
But they are also connected, and their interaction is deeper than educational 
doctrines often figure. Such a consideration might be dismissed as a 
humanistic interference with a more dependable scientific approach. 
However, the whole point of these studies lies in their capacity to predict 
some given life outcomes – like a successful marriage, a fulfilling working 
life, civic engagement, social cohesion, and so forth. And all these 
enterprises entail a motivational energy and a meaning which will hardly 
come from the fascination of practice itself. Therefore, integrating character 
and SES, moral qualities and skills, turns out to be a meaningful task. 
Nevertheless, given the divergent assumptions of the two approaches, 
integrating them is far more challenging than simply pinpointing their 
differences.  
Such an integration is sometimes grasped through the distinction 
between moral character and performance character (Elias et al., 2014, 
especially pp. 272-274). In its inner logic, such a distinction represents a 
clear example of ‘re-entry’ – the logical move through which a distinction 
is reintroduced in what has been distinguished. In this particular case, the 
distinction between character and a performative notion of skills comes to 
articulate two types of character – or two aspects thereof. Moral character 
differs from performance character, because knowing the good is not the 
same as doing the good. Doing the good also requires skills. The basic idea 
is that social and emotional skills can be used for good or ill, but to be used 
for good they must be mastered well. SES are not synonymous with (good) 
character, but good character requires such competencies. A large number 
of skills are needed in order to enact shared values. People may want to do 
the right thing, but might not know how to do it successfully. In terms of 
learning, it is skills that determine how well people will be able to pick up 
the cues provided by educational agencies. Moreover, as Elias and 
colleagues point out, many of the forces at work in socializing children 
which are opposite to SES also tend to be opposite to character. The mass 
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culture pressure for short-term goal setting, impulsive behaviour, extreme 
and poorly managed emotions, violent problem solving, etc. make good 
examples.  
It must be noted that the convergence we are indicating is indeed 
symmetrical. The reason character needs skills must be as clear as the 
reason SES need moral character. The former is clear enough: one may 
well have a concern, and care about some good, but s/he also needs to be 
able to do what must be done to pursue such a concern. The latter could be 
understood in terms of motivation and direction. One may well be able to 
care for other people, or know how to be sociable and cooperative, but 
could choose not to display this capacity in certain cases, if s/he believes 
it’s not worth doing it. And things get even more intertwined: only through 
the actual practice of care one may come to discover the good that lies in a 
given relationship. This inner relationality involves more than a skill, while 
it may indeed reveal the latter’s value and motivate efforts to achieve it. 
Moreover, skills require direction: «maladaptive direction, such as might 
come from extremist or criminal ideologies, can be pursued effectively 
through SEL competencies» (Elias et al., 2014, p. 286)
19
. Therefore, it is 
still necessary to be exposed to moral ideals.  
To sum up, the focus on the ‘whole child’ needs both purpose and 
quality, meaning and effectiveness, process and content. This can only be 
achieved through a comprehensive system of socialization, in which the 
totality of supportive factors, environments, conditions and processes work 
together to build a personal profile, not just a set of skills directly 
connected with explicit programs.  
For this reasons, it doesn’t seem ill-founded to claim that character 
education and SES are moving towards a convergence some authors have 
described as inexorable and long overdue. It is, however, challenging to 
spell out a processual view of this allegedly necessary connection. 
Although several streams of influence are mentioned in the literature which 
are deemed essential for their intertwining pathways with moral and 
character education, neither seems to be easily integrated into a consistent 
model of how character and SES emerge over time, both at the individual 
and the collective level. This task could be understood as the educational 
                                                     
19 The expression ‘SEL’ in the quotation above stands for ‘social and emotional learning’, 
which we can well regard as equivalent to SES, only pointing to the learning process instead 
of the skills acquired.  
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companion of a more general cultural, indeed civilizational agenda. The 
latter consists of finding mediating processes to build moral universalism in 
and through particularities, and to develop culturally qualified pathways to 
create globalized social environments.   
What I can do here is just move a preliminary step in that direction. Its 
significance lies in illustrating a possible way to argue for an integrated 
model, not in presenting a presumably complete instance of such a model.  
First, we must recall the formal definition of character as comprising the 
capacity of resistance, or to delay gratification, attachment to the good and 
moral autonomy. My thesis is that such a notion is matched in the social 
sciences by Archer’s theory of reflexive socialization (Archer, 2000; 2003).  
Let us sketchily outline the key points of such a way to conceive of 
socialization. Archer’s realist morphogenetic theory formulates the problem 
in pretty innovative terms,  proposing an ontologically stratified, dynamic, 
and connective theory of the human being and of his/her relationship with 
the social domain. I’ll just indicate the crucial steps:  
(1) the human being emerges through relationships with various 
layers of reality: nature, practice and society, developing in the first place a 
continual sense of self which is not socially derived; 
(2) practical relations have priority, and play a pivotal role in 
constituting the primary identity of the self and its fundamental categories;  
(3) the process of personification then undergoes various stages, 
and finally gets to constitute a personal identity and social identity;  
(4) the basic operators in this process are the personal emergent 
properties (PEP), both first order – emotions – and second order – i.e. 
internal conversation as the bulk of human reflexivity; 
(5) these PEP emerge as an outcome of human relations with the 
three layers of reality, since these generate care or concerns; the order 
established among these defines what people care about most, the 
‘exchange rates’ among various possible courses of action, ending up with 
the establishment of a person’s own modus vivendi, that is the way people 
inhabit this world, which is unique to each;  
(6) such a process has discernment, deliberation and dedication as 
its focal points. They consist of reflecting upon various possibilities of 
action and experience, deciding how to prioritize things and domains of 
personal investment, and translating one’s decision into an adequate life 
plan, and follow it through related practices.  
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What we see here is a stratified concept of agency and the person, based 
on the notion of the human experience of reality, both social and non-
social. Such an experience is a relation with nature, practice, and society, 
and is mediated by our PEP
 
– which in turn are not pre-established, but 
emerge through that very relation. Emotions are the first commentaries we 
make on the reality we experience. Later we reflect upon them, fixing our 
priorities and thereby establishing an order in our way to relate to the 
various aspects of reality. This entails a decision about what our ultimate 
concern is, and how the other concerns that inevitably emerge from our 
relations with the world can dovetail with it. The relatively stable outcome 
of this reflexive operation is called the modus vivendi we establish with the 
world, namely our existential plan. Ultimate concerns, therefore, establish a 
meaningful relation between the world as it is and our plans for life. And it 
is only through this relation that our plans and the practices through which 
we want to enact them can come to being and find concrete realization. 
From these plans in turn depends the way we ‘make our way through the 
world’, going through different social contexts, structures, and roles.  
This view clearly has multiple and far-reaching implications. Three of 
them are particularly relevant in the present context. First, the link between 
individual and society and its mediation take place in a connective way. 
The dreams, concerns, and life plans of human beings are the locus where 
social conditionings receive their “specific weight”, as well as specifically 
human “replies”. Thus, human beings “count” for society, not only as 
numbers or as the necessary support of communication, and not even as 
bearers of “internalized” ideas and values they are not aware of or do not 
control anyway. Archer has conceived of a systematic way to show how 
this happens and is integrated in the process of socio-cultural 
morphogenesis. Secondly, the human / social connection is not a 
conflationary one, since human identity is not swallowed by the social 
domain, is not the gift of society. Finally, realist social theory argues that 
evaluation, in a broad sense of the word, represents the basic existential 
attitude characterising the human condition in the world
20
. This point finds 
expression in the crucial concept of concern (Sorge), which bears a double 
meaning: what inescapably concerns us, calls for our attention and presses 
us to deal with it (something we cannot simply ignore), and what we care 
about, what we are ideally engaged in. We can summarize both meanings 
                                                     
20 This point is also systematically treated by Andrew Sayer (Sayer, 2011).  
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by defining concern as ‘what is urging us’. What is important here is to 
mark the distance of this perspective from the economic-instrumental 
semantics of interest. It is concern – and the whole reflexive process 
revolving around it – that ultimately defines personal and social identity, as 
a hard and provisional achievement, ever subject to reflexive monitoring 
and revision.  
Even this overly quick summary should demonstrate that a non-
reductionist model of socialization and identity building can accommodate 
the idea of a self that is constituted in moral space, and the related notion of 
character
21
. The reason to see this correspondence is that the elements of 
character are human properties, without which Archer’s theorized 
socialization process would not find an adequate subject to enact it. At the 
same time, such a socialization theory shows how character can emerge as 
a result of social and practical relationships, thereby explaining its 
dynamics. In a nutshell, people without character could not successfully go 
through reflexive socialization, while reflexive socialization provides a 
sound social scientific ground for the emergence of character. This remark 
is not meant to establish any pointless circularity. We should here 
remember that Archer’s morphogenesis of the self works both as a model 
of the first emergence of consistent selfhood and as a framework for the 
ongoing reflexive life of the subject over the life course.  
In other terms, we could conclude that character constitutes the 
integrated set of personal properties which qualify a personal modus 
vivendi in moral perspective, as the emergent outcome of a reflexive way to 
shape one’s relations to the world. In a nutshell, character might be a 
conceptual element in a ‘sociology of concern’, which studies the 
morphogenesis of personal and social identity, conceptualized as the 
development of a modus vivendi – that is, of a particular way of being-in-
the-world. Arguably, different types of modus vivendi are conducive to – 
and in turn require the development of – different kinds of character. This 
holds the promise of the integration of character within social scientific 
views of the human person. A further theoretical move is needed to specify 
how SES development must parallel this developmental model, in order to 
sustain the process of identification, attachment to and pursuit of 
meaningful goals effectively. One interesting perspective comes from the 
                                                     
21 This means that Taylor’s claim about the inherent reductionism of the sociological 
approaches to identity can both inspire Archer’s theory and be challenged by it.  
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theories which apply neuropsychological research to address the 
development of moral personhood. For example, the theory of adaptive 
ethical expertise discussed by Narvaez and Bock (2014) looks at ethical 
attitudes and behaviours as a competence. Such an ethical expertise is 
articulated into four processes, in which moral experts are supposed to be 
highly competent. These are ethical sensitivity, ethical judgement, ethical 
focus, and ethical action. As for all expertise, these dimensions can be 
further analyzed in their component skills (see table 2 below).  
What is interesting here is that we could establish some correspondence 
between these dimensions of ethical expertise and the phases of the 
reflexive process of emergence of personal and social identity.  Experts in 
ethical sensitivity are good at quickly and thoroughly discerning the moral 
nature of a situation, and the role they could play in it.  That’s a perceptual 
skill, which may stand in a complementary relation with the moment of 
‘discernment’ in Archer’s model, because such a skill could influence the 
way people reflect upon their emotions and develop the right moral 
intuitions in relation to such emotional responses. It could even influence 
the emotional response in the first place – in the same way a cultivated taste 
for refined food guides our spontaneous response to different kinds of food 
(e.g. junk food). Expertise in ethical judgement can be connected with the 
moment of deliberation, while expertise in moral action resonates with 
dedication. Moral focus could correspond to the basic desire for acting 
morally, or to the capacity of commitment.  
 
Table 2. The articulation of moral expertise 
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Source: adaptation from Narvaez, Bock (2014), p. 143 
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Therefore, it is somewhat implied in the general orientation to a 
concern-oriented way of acting and thinking. In other words, the process of 
discernment, deliberation, and dedication comes to be ethically qualified 
insofar as it is performed with the help of this expertise – itself a personal 
property of individuals. Moral action emerges from the relationships 
between these properties of persons. The skills listed in Table 2 could be 
said to be necessary for people to perform successfully in each stage of the 
process, and in turn they are reinforced by the same ongoing process. This 
establishes a comprehensive, psycho-sociological model of the emergence 
of personal identity and moral personhood. 
Education can target these skills, both through the immersion of subjects 
in a relevant domain and through the presentation of rational explanations 
for actions and decisions in given situations.  
The argument I have presented here was not meant to be more than the 
suggestion of a possible way to develop an integrated approach, which 
looks at the contribution of various disciplines and approaches, while 
keeping humanistic concerns as a major compass. More analytical and 
more advanced work must follow up. However, it is clear that self-
formation and the forms of personal and social life which will develop as a 
creative-and-adaptive response to the turbulent dynamics of boundless 
morphogenesis will be contingent upon the development of such complex, 
non-reductionist approaches. The dilemmas, and the possible ways out, that 
have been outlined here point to a way to connect persons, culture and 
society in such a way that none can be reduced to the others, and that the 
relations-and-distinctions between them still design a viable space for 
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